As substantial esse, this intellect is the act in which and through which the soul subsists immaterially but as immaterial, it is not the soul’s esse insofar as this act is the actuality of the body and the bodily faculties. In light of this, we should like to propose an alternative (corrective) view, one which we claim fits those aspects of Aquinas’ philosophy better, namely: the agent intellect is the substantial and immaterial actus essendi of the soul insofar as through this act the soul can make the forms present in phantasms intelligible. We will argue, indeed, that the traditional position advocated by Thomas and his followers regarding the ontological status of the agent intellect does not square well with Thomas’ own theory of knowledge and metaphysics. As we shall see, Thomas’ own conception of the role of the agent intellect in our cognitive life, together with the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of that role, ought to give us pause. Yet, despite the overwhelming textual evidence proving that for Thomas all human potencies are propria, we think that should not be the final word on the subject. Given that no intellectual potency informs a bodily organ, many prominent commentators have thus concluded that the agent intellect is an immaterial and necessary accidental quality of the soul. potencies (of which the agent intellect is one) are necessary accidents flowing from the soul’s essence, i.e. In other words, the identification of the agent intellect with the soul’s substantial esse is not complete, for it solely concerns that esse as it remains immune from matter and enables the soul to make the forms of material things intelligible in act.Īlthough Thomas never formulated this specific question explicitly, he did provide an answer to it by claiming, in no ambiguous terms, that all human. Finally, as the act through which the soul can make the forms of material things intelligible in act, the agent intellect is identical with the soul’s substantial and immaterial esse only inasmuch as the latter makes this specific operation possible.
If we contemplate the ontological structure of the human soul, that is, its accidents and substance, in which one of these ‘categories’ does the agent intellect belong?Īlthough Thomas never formulated this specific question explicitly, he did provide an answer to it by claiming, in no ambiguous terms, that all human potencies (of which the agent intellect is one) are necessary accidents flowing from the soul’s essence, i.e. For centuries, many Thomists have faced a difficult metaphysical problem.